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Notes on Iraq
These are just rough notes on Iraq - unbalanced, ill-considered, but possibly containing a few useful links. Put here because they're sitting on my computer not being updated, and not doing much else. Any references to 'now' could mean any time in the past 3 years. Take with a barrel of salt....
Adnan Pachachi and Ibrahim Brahimi
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Iraqi politics is something of a blood sport at the moment, especially since the arrival of Lakhdar Brahimi. Brahimi's basic plan is that up to the 2005 elections, power should be in the hands of a UN-appointed triumvirate and a 100-member assembly. He wants the triumvirate (more precisely, a president and two vice-presidents) to consist of technocrats without party affiliations, and he plans to avoid using current members of the Governing Council. The logic behind this is that leaders of large political blocs will be tempted to abuse their power to build support bases for the 2005 elections, and so will lay the foundations for a new electoral system based on corrupt, patronage-driven machine politics.
This plan could have some merit in a perfect world. In Iraq, it's practically political suicide for Brahimi. Many of the Governing Council members are former exiles with very limited constituencies within Iraq. If they keep their fingers in the pie, they stand a chance of keeping their own positions going through patronage. If they leave for a moment, they probably won't ever get back to the top levels of Iraqi politics.
Brahimi has provided plenty of ammunition for his enemies. Shiites can attack him as a Sunni, anti-Americans can attack him as in the pocket of the USA (he was appointed at the US's insistence, and US official Robert Blackwill is rumoured to have played a major role in drafting the Brahimi plan), and his opposition to the 1991 Gulf war can be portrayed as support for Baathism or for Saddam Hussein. Moreover, he is seen as close to Jordan, since his daughter is married to the king's brother, Prince Ali.
The INC has criticised his alleged closeness to fellow-Sunni Adnan Pachachi, an octogenarian governing council member with ambitions to be the elder statesman of Iraqi politics. The INC intensely dislikes Pachachi, who its newspaper, al-Mutadar (?), describes as 'a dictator and a paranoid power-monger who was wroking with the US autorities to squeeze political party leaders out of the new government'
It turns out that the US, despite its alleged influence over Brahimi and his plan, doesn't like the idea of shutting parties out of the interim government. According to an excellent New York Times article by Steven Weisman, the US particularly wants to keep a role for Pachachi, and for political factions tied to Ali al-Sistani. One official interviewed by Weisman shows a baffling faith in the ability of politicians to abjure self-interest
The administration agrees with Mr. Brahimi that whoever joins the government should not make long-term commitments or reach any decisions that might benefit the parties they represent.
"the voting will take place in those countries with a large number of Iraqis" (1)
expat Iraqis "could account for up to 15 percent of the total in January"
Issue of distrust of Iran
And here's a lovely bit of neutrality. The foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, explains "I lived many years abroad, and I believe it's critical"
Electoral alliances:
A: the Sadr-Chalabi alliance, as reported by the New York Times (2). This seems really odd: I don't see what Chalabi has to offer Sadr or his supporters. Can anyone explain?
SOURCES
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NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/05/international/middleeast/05expats.html?ex=1257397200&en=964738816c34fa2d&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland:
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http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/international/middleeast/07election.html?ex=1257570000&en=b4e74837e71c94c4&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland
Harvard talk on post-conflict justice
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Just watched an interesting talk from the harvard law school. Speaker is Noah Feldman, who was involved in the initial ORHA/CPA constitution plans in Iraq, and helped draft the TAL. He also wrote After Jihad
He distinguishes 3 elements of post-conflict law in Iraq and afghanistan:
- Local custom
- Islamic legal theory
- International law
In order to have a political settlement that works, you need to incorporate all three. This isn't relativism: he doesn't think all forms of law are inherently equally valid, and he thinks that debates that involve merit are the best way to properly combine the three traditions.
Iraqi Constitution: July 2005 update
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The deadline for this is August 15, so things are hotting up
The NYT has recently obtained a chapter from a draft of the constitution. The NYT picks up on challenges to women's rights: dropping the requirement that women make up 25% of the asembly, requiring equal rights only if this is in accordance with shariah,
Of 71 people drafting the constition, <10 are women.
more on this, probably, by googling 'personal status law'
The shooting of two Sunni Arabs on the drafting committee (Mejbil Issa and Dhamin Hussein al-Obeidi, members of the National Dialogue Council) leads to a temporary resignation of (all?) Sunni Arabs on the committee. NYT, 21/7/05. One of the resigning drafters is Fakhri al-Qaisi, who implied that the killings were because of Mejbil Issa's opposition to regional autonomy. Another report has NDC spokesman Mohammed Dayini blaming it on the government, and hence on Shiites.
Corruption in iraq: some angles to consider
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the US is reducing its spending on humanitarian programs in Iraq: how will this affect corruption?
possible solutions to corruption:
[in this, think: what should we be advocating, as non-Iraqis? how can we outsiders stop our actions corrupting Iraq?]
- decentralising governance
- supporting local media
- apply anti-corruption legislation to foreign companies operating in Iraq
- limits to the free market
- give supreme audit board a seat on the IAMB
- don't use corruption as an excuse to cut down on funding to Iraq
Corruption of who? we're usually talking about government - but there's also corporate corruption, and corruption of journalists. The paid placement scandal would be an example of corruption of journalists.
extortion of aid agencies as a form of corruption
what does the new Iraqi constitution say about corruption?
party funding - problem of benefits for the incumbent
"donors and international agencies should be ready to suspend non-humanitarian aid to avoid consolidating hte power of corrupt politicians"
79: "Donors and agencies need to be exemplary in applying standards of transparency and accountability, beginning with the oversight of their own programs The example of Iraq is particularly dismal in this respct The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Departnemnt of Defence initially had only 80 peope examining the largest reconstruction program in history, half the number needed according to the Association of Inspectors General, and eventually outsourced oversight to private companies ging rise to potential conflicts of interest. International supervision has been even worse: the work of the International Advisory and Monitoring Bard for Iraq, set up to monitor the Development Fund for Iraq independently, has been substantially delayed" [doh: why in God's name did I just type all of that out?]
[ends]
[see bibliographic data]
73: "Many post-conflict countries figure among the most corrupt int eh world, and corruption is one of the key concerns of local populations"
"ordinary people resort to corruption in order to deal with the hardships of war"
post-conflict wpolitical transition tends to reinforce corruption among political parties
"the presence f aid agencies, as well as large numbers of foreign troops, often leads to highly inflated local prices and salaries, thereby contributing to an economic context favourable to corruption"
consequences of corruption
"corruption may occasionally have short-term ositiveeffects, for example, in helping secure some degree of political, economic and social stability" [75]
suggests 3 ways to reduce corruption:
- ensuring public support
- providing an appropriate economic and regulatory context
- securing a legal framework for transparency and accountability
good governance:: reconstruction management procedures pass anti-corruption legislation create implementing agencies reform funding of political parties public commitment legislative approval of spending new constitution should include a commitment to fight corruption
What can you compare corruption in Iraq with?
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Kurdistan since 1992 Lebanon
Transparency International produces annual rankings of corruption levels. The 2004 rankings included Iraq. It was ranked joint 129th place, out of 146 countries,s coring just 2.1 out of 10 on a scale for freedom of corruption [gcr05:238]
Iraq's anti-corruption institutions are the Commission for Public Integrity (CPI), the Board of Supreme Audit, and the Inspector General's Office. The Commission for Public Integrity was formed on 31 January 2004. It's head, Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, was appointed by Paul Bremer. It has issued warrants for more than 40 government officials, including former ministers Layla Abdul Lateef (labour) and Louay Hatem al-Eris (transport)
On 1 July 2004 Ehsan Karim, head of the Board of Supreme Audit, was killed by a bomb. Other corruption-fighters have been killed - the man responsible for investigating corruption at the Interior Ministry, [.........]
The CPI was formed in late January 2004. Although the press release fourming the CPI emphasises the role of the Governing Council in creating it - http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040131IGCintegrity_PR.html - in legal terms it was created through CPA order 55. This defined it as "the principal enforcement arms of Iraq's anti-corruption laws", working with the Board of Supreme Audit and the Inspectors General of Iraqi ministries
bbc report on CPI activities, june 2005 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4627923.stm
also think about - Iraqi Inspectors General,
Some have argued that corruption funds the insurgency. \footnote{The link between insurgency and corruption was reported in the Daily Telegraph, 7 Feb 2006, and the New York Times (??)},
Numerous examples of corruption
hillah
The CPA office in Hillah has been described as the 'Enron of Iraq'. Here, the CPA employed Robert Stein, a convicted fraudster. Stein worked with contractor Philip Bloom to defraud the CPA of up to $3.5 million. Charges have now been brought against Stein, Bloom, and ??several other people???
see http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/11/17/iraq.contracts.ap/index.html, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060201/apongoot/iraqcontractbribes2
cpa outpost in Hilla - 'enron of iraq' - fake accounting, 10-12 people under suspicion. brazen corruption scheme, us official handing out contracts to a us businessman, who gave him kickbacks then they bought cars and real estate. lt-col brian wheeler - he was the bagman, carrying money back to the US. bob stein, in charge of reconstruction, alleged beneficiary. bill bloom, businessman receiving the contracts. $3.5m in contracts under question.
Here contractor Philip Bloom worked with CPA official Robert Stein, a convicted fraudster who has now pled guilty to charges of fraud and conspiracy
Custer Battles
Contractors Custer Battles committed perhaps $50m of fraud in Iraq - and yet continued to be employed by the government for another year
Westhusing
Corruption has also had tragic personal costs. In 2005, Col. Ted Westhusing, a West Point professor training police forces in Iraq, encountered evidence of serious corruption in USIS, a private security company working in the same field. On 4 June that year he killed himself, writing in his suicide note that "I cannot support a msn [mission] that leads to corruption, human rights abuse and liars. I am sullied. I came to serve honorably and feel dishonored. Death before being dishonored any more" \footnote{T. Christian Miller, 'A journey that ended in anguish'. LA Times, 13 December 2005. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=9312}
juburu
defence minister
[put it in a bibliography as jagcr]
justin alexander bibt, pp 82-
82: immediate post-war seizure of assets, caused by the power vacuum
quote from a contractor in baghdad, 20040310:
"The political parties took everything they could get hold of. STate property went up for grabs. If they could get away with this, how do they expect ordinary people to behave?" [83]
"A survey held in early may 2004 revealed that 58 per cent of Iraqi respondents had heard of corruption in the reconstruction process, and 32 per cent believed htat such malpractices involved CPA officials" [al-mashriq (iraq), 4 may 2004]
"Iraqis have largely felt excluded from the political process going on in Baghdad, and the impression that something dishonest is going on behind the scenes understandably makes Iraqis reach out for the c-word to make sense of developments" [83]
many eyewitness accounts - see jagcr, p. 84
"Experiences in the former Soviet Union, and other indebted countires that have been forced into rapid privatisation, suggest that the selling off of sate-owned enterprises under conditions of opaque governance, combined wih the lack of a free market, is almost certain to result in widespread corruption" [84]
b: financial statement c: rant about poor accounting procedures d: factual findings about oil sales e: factual findings about oil proceeds receipts account
huh? :''the finance department of Ministry of Oil was fired, so most of the accounting data was lost including the back up of accounting data which was stored in the finance department. Consequently the Ministry of Oil did not have any supporting documents for most of accounting transactions for 2005 year''
some bits of accounting irritate me - ''we believe that the dipstick is not an accurate measuring device''
Corruption in the iraqi government
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iraqi defence department has lost $1bn to corruption
AK Jain ed, 1998
defining corruption
3: "sale by government officials of government property for personal gains" - but this def. misses out a lot
rent seeking DUP - Directly UnProductive Activities agency theory - principal-agent relationship
Robert Looney - Corruption's reflection
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in 'strategic insights', march 2005
because of saddam and sanctions, international institutions have very little information on
I'm totally crap, but I'm going to have another go at this...
lines to follow up
meshaan al-Juburi (stole money for armed security) commission on public integrity radhi hamza al-radhi (chairman of iraq's commission on public integrity) hazem shaalan - former defence minister, charged with corruption, now living in london (see nyt juburi article) what do the audits say? what do the ministries say westhusing suicide t. christian miller, la times reporter writing a book on corruption in iraq corporatewatch - iraq stuff. http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list=classt&class=3&type=124, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type=27 defence ministry iamb transparency international - annual report, march 2005 SIGIR - special inspector general for iraq reconstruction http://www.iraqieconomy.org/home/macro/corruption/ http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1522983,00.html http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1522983,00.html (and linked sigir audit) accused ex-ministers layla abdul lateef, louay hatem al-eris role of Waxman in dealing with this US-IRaqi Anticorruption Working Group
meshaan al-juburi
nytimes article - http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002785308_corrupt05.html
oil smuggling - see nyt article
the contracting issue
contractors described as 'Haramia' (thieves) - UPI. From same article, schools being painted more than once
use of asian contractors for US bases in Iraq
failure of service delivery
Corruption has concrete impacts on other political issues. The recent (early 2006) gasoline supply crisis is tightly linked to corruption.
Gasoline not being delivered to iraq - halliburton charging 2.5 times local prices for gasoline - http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13249
mistreatment of third-country nationals
see http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12675
contribution to the insurgency
ali allawi has claimed that insurgents reap 40-50% of the profits from oil smuggling [http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/010053.php]
notes from on point (http://www.onpointradio.org/shows/2005/12/20051206amain.asp)
t christian miller, writing book 'blood money. a story of wasted billions, lost lives, and corporate greed in iraq
colonel westhusing suicide professor at west point, had written a lot about military ethics - dissertation on nature of honour. jan 2005 goes to iraq, runs program training iraqis to be police officers. happens through usif. in may gets anonymous whistleblower letter, accuses USIS of contractual fraud,
maybe 20 billion dollars unaccounted for. cash missing, army reservist from wisconsin stole money (?)
'outsourcing the reconstruction' reconstruction was a for-profit enterprise. it therefore attracted people who wanted to make money.
cpa outpost in Hilla - 'enron of iraq' - fake accounting, 10-12 people under suspicion. brazen corruption scheme, us official handing out contracts to a us businessman, who gave him kickbacks then they bought cars and real estate. lt-col brian wheeler - he was the bagman, carrying money back to the US. bob stein, in charge of reconstruction, alleged beneficiary. bill bloom, businessman receiving the contracts. $3.5m in contracts under question.
Here contractor Philip Bloom worked with CPA official Robert Stein, a convicted fraudster who has now pled guilty to charges of fraud and conspiracy
\footnote{Brief articles on this were carried by the New York Times (17 November 2005, James Glanz, "American faces charges of graft for work in Iraq2)
iraqi corruption, us military corruption, private contractor corruption
attempts to reduce corruption
nyt0602: "Iraq set up a new post in each government ministry to do internal monitoring, but two of the officials were assassinated last year just as they were about to publicize the results of investigations. Six other employees of the Commission on Public Integrity have been killed; the rest live in constant fear of retaliatory violence."
ngo approaches
transparency international - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4353491.stm. could be "the biggest corruption scandal in history", says TI. look at their annual report
IAMB criticism
westhusing suicide
sources
UPI050329 29/3/05 - http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12013 nyt0502 - http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002785308_corrupt05.html
look at brookings iraq index - some interesing poll data on perceived corruption. as of november 2005, many people thought corruption had got worse over the previous three months
there will be lots of theoretical work on this - 'shadow economies' and so on.
Polling data on corruption
In late 2005, the International Republican Institute asked Iraqis what three issues most affected their daily life. Fully 25% listed corruption first, as the issue that most affected their lives. They therefore considered corruption more important than everything except security - significantly more important than housing (17%)
The significance of corruption seems to be increasing over time. In September 2005, only 17% ranked corruption among the three most important issues.
And things are getting worse. 49% considered that in three months until November 2005 corruption had become 'worse' or 'much worse', with only 10% thinking it was becoming 'better' or 'much better'.
they would like a new government to prioritise. 32% listed corruption among these three issues (in first place by 4%, second by 8%, and third by 20%). Corruption was therefore considered more important than amending the constitution (prioritised by 12%), strenghtening the armed forces (16%) or the police (22%).
Even more considered it one of the issues that affected their daily life
This means more people were concerned about corruption that about strengthening the police or armed forces, or about amending the constitution
later running notes
At least 20 percent of US spending in Iraq is lost to corruption, says. Charles Adwan of the Lebanon [office] of Transparency International.กษ ...
from www.epic-usa.org/portals/1/epiclaborreport_2.pdf
Corruption immediately after the invasion
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In terms of the amount stolen, the high point of corruption was the period immeidately after the invasion of Iraq.
The luxury goods of the former regime - cars, art, and cash - were given to, or taken by, the new elites with almost no accounting. Immense amounts of cash were moved around Iraq without any accountability - $200m kept in a safe, the key to which was in an unattended backpack, $1.4 billion flown by helicopter to Kurdistan and unaccounted for. \footnote{This was investigated by the BBC's 'file on four' programme in early 2005. A transcript of their report can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/fileon4/3708232.stm}
Corruption in Iraq: angles to look up
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US corruption: congressional reports, media attention, naomi klein resource curse: ask Per (maybe look up his dissertation) go through HILDA on klevnas.net
what have the IAMB, DFI, etc found
iraqrevenuewatch
talk to:
- Iraq Revenue Watch
- Justin Alexander
www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/index.htm (foote, block,crane, gray, 'economic policy and prospects in iraq'
look at transparency international surveys: www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html
christian aid report "iraq: the missing billions"
CPA order 59 (June 2004) established protection for whistleblowers
Notes from the Jan 2006 SIGIR report
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In November 2005 an anticorruption summit was convened by the US ambassador to Iraq. This led to a US-Iraqi Anticorruption Working Group Oct 05 quarterly report - sigir recommended an
nov 05: congress wants sigir to have jurisdiction over cpa programs and operations
recent us policy affecting Iraq - National Security Presidential Directive 44; DoD Directive 3000.05
will need a massive footnote or aside pointing this out:
- UNDP, world bank
- national governments
- transparency international
- academic literature
academic:
- R. Stapenhurst and SJ Kpundeh, 1999: Curbing Corruption: toward a model for building national integrity. Economic development institute of the world bank 0821342576
- AK Jain, ed, 1998: Economics of Corruption. 0792838
- AK Jaine, ed, 2001: The political economy of corruption. Routledge
lots of information on this - just need to summarise it very quickly. Look in particular at:
- impact on iraqi perceptions
- future legacy
- contribution to other corruption
'cost-plus' contracts no-contest 'Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity' - government awards an unspecified amount of future work to some contractor 'contract bundling' disqualifies smaller companies
85-6: "Ed Kubba, a member of the American-Iraqi Chamber of Commerce, mused, "if you take US $10 million from the US government and sub the job out to Iraqi businessmen for US $250,00, is that business, or is it corruption" - cited by Naomi Klein in the Nation
kickbacks, esp. for translators
anti-corruption initiatives:
- Commission on Public Integrity
- Board of Supreme Audit
'the arrest of the ministry of finance's chief anti-corruption watchman, Sabah Nuri, on charges of embezzling US$22 million in the country's otherwise successful currency exchange for new dinars"
The rampant corruption among contractors has received some attention, partly thanks to the efforts of US Congressman (?) Henry Waxman
Halliburton charging twice what others charged for gasoline, 'cost plus' contracts awarded without competition,
don't forget: this is Iraqi money!
Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector general found $11m-$26m of Iraqi property unaccounted for
oil exports unmetered
april 2005: SIGIR audit into Hillah
\footnote{}
Trying hard not to flip, after realising that I missed a UN Iraq resolution for 6 months (!!). It even has its own commitee
The 1518 committee is chaired by Romania, and vice-chaired by Pakistan and the Philippines.
The work of the 1518 committee is based on a list of nasty Iraqis created pursuant to UNSCR1518
At the request of the United States, the 1518 committee has expanded this list to include another 16 names. On 28 April it added a further five names
The Telegraph, Times, Independent and Guardian all report that the US is going to stop funding Iraq reconstrucdtion projects. Here is the original Washington Post article
It won't happen until 2007.
This, from the Guardian, is the killer sentence:
"A decision not to renew the reconstruction programme would leave Iraq with the burden of tens of billions of dollars in unfinished projects"
Or perhaps it's
"Neary half the funds earmarked for reconstruction were diverted towards fighting the insurgency and preparations to put Saddam Hussein on trial"
How does a single trial cost any significant fraction of twenty billion dollars?
revolving door between CPA and oil companies
CPA appointed advisors who had previously been senior oil company executives until october 2003
- Phillip Carroll (Shell)
- Gary Vogler (ExxonMobil) october 2003-march 2004
- Bob McKee (ConocoPhillips)
- Terry Adams (BP) from march 2004:
- Mike Stinson (Conoco Phillips)
- Bob Morgan (BP) from June 2004, Stinson became an adviser to the US embassy in Baghdad
Ibrahim Bahr-al-Uloum wanted to introduce PSAs, and to give priority to US and European companies(FT interview quoted in Crude Designs)
it is claimed that a Petroleum Law has already been drafted (as of June 2005), and is waiting for the elections before being implemented
June 2004: KRG signed an exploration deal with DNO, a Norwegian oil company. In October 2005 they made an agreement with "K Petroleum Company"
conclusion
oil industry is likely to be sorted out in early 2006 psa agreements could be fixed for 25-40 years disputes would be heard outside Iraq
Economics and foreign relations in Iraq
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[the basic idea: Iraqi economics, of necessity, takes a back seat to politics. Similarly, economic success can only be achieved by crafty politics: flattering aid donors, playing the USA and Iran against each other, etc, etc. This is always true in oil economies (did Per's dissertation have anything to say about that?) but especially so in Iraq]
compare to the sanctions regime: there, again, poltiics trumped economics, and economics was a means of doing politics.
the july 2005 Iran deal
see JC in Salon.
Gulf Daily News values the deal at $1bn, compared to an existing $700m annual Iran-Iraq trade
In early May, Iraq's central bank threatened to withdraw banking permits from National Bank of Kuwait, Standard Chartered and HSBC unless they open branches in Iraq. These were the winners of a bidding process involving 15 banks, but have failed to establish themselves in Iraq for security reasons.
Useful written answer (2005/01/31) on DFID payments to multilateral organisations on Iraq.
Website: [http://www.iamb.info/ iamb.info]
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'''International Advisory and Monitoring Board''' (IAMB) is the body responsibel for monitoring use of funds held in the [[Developemnt Fund for Iraq]].
== History of the IAMB ==
=== Establishment ===
The establishment of the IOMB was required under paragraph 12 of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003), which "Notes the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq and to be audited by independent public accountants approved by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq and looks forward to the early meeting of that International Advisory and Monitoring Board, whose members shall include duly qualified representatives of the Secretary-General, of the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, of the Director-General of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, and of the President of the World Bank"
Despite this, the IAMB was not established until October 2003, and it was inactive until the end of that year. This delay was partially due to disputes over its mandate. A [http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/documents/iamb_tor.pdf draft set of Terms of Reference] was prepared on June 10, 2003 byt he US and later leaked to campaigners. It shows that the US wanted the IAMB to be an essentially toothless body. It would not have had its own secretariat, and therefore would have relied on the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]] for administrative support. The CPA would also have appointed the first chair and five non-voting members of the board.
France and Germany [http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2003/030909amendments.pdf were concerned] both by the weakness of the proposed IAMB, and by the delay in establishing it. Under their pressure, [http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2003/res1511.pdf UN Security Council Resolution 1511] (16 October 2003): "24. Reminds all Member States of their obligations under paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003) in particular the obligation to immediately cause the transfer of funds, other financial assets and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people;"
The IAMB was [http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr03176.htm established] shortly after this, on 24 October 2003.
=== Activities ===
The first meetings were unproductive: in the first three meetings (9/12/03, 22/12/03, 12/2/04), it neither appointed auditors, nor found qualified Iraqi observers as required in their terms of reference.
==== External Audit ====
On 24 March 2004, the IAMB [http://www.iamb.info/min/m031704.htm approved] KPMG as external auditors of the DFI. KPMG had been nominated by the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]]
==== Other Activities ====
In addition to formally appointing external auditors, the IAMB has raised various concerns directly with the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]]. These have included
- [http://www.iamb.info/min/m031704.htm the lack of metering of oil extraction]
- [http://www.iamb.info/min/m031704.htm bartering of goods as a substitute for international trade]
- [http://www.iamb.info/min/m031704.htm contracts awarded to [[Halliburton]] without competitive bidding
- [http://www.iamb.info/min/m031704.htm DFI financial statements not meeting international standards for financial reporting
==== IAMB meetings ====
== Structure ==
=== Membership ===
Under UNSCR 1483, membership of the IAMB must include duly qualified representatives of:
- the UN Secretary-General
- the Manageing Director of the [[International Monetary Fund]]
- the Director-General of the [[Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development]]
- the President of the [[World Bank]]
The names of attendees at each meeting are listed in the [http://www.iamb.info/minutes.htm minutes]. [http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr03209.htm Biographies] of the first IAMB members were made available by the [[IMF]].
The initial IAMB terms of reference did not give voting rights to representatives of the [[Iraqi interim administration]].
[http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/documents/iamb.shtml International Advisory and Monitoring Board]
, June 10, 2003. From ''iraq revenue watch.org'', "an initiative from the [[Open Society Institute]]", i.e. [[George Soros]].
was "established as part of UN Security Council Resolution 1483," approved May 22, 2003, "which lifts sanctions on the country, phases out the UN [[Oil-for-Food Program]], and aims to meet the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the Iraqi people. The IAMB is expected to appoint independent public accountants to audit the development fund established with future Iraqi oil revenues."[http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20113401~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html]
:"The Security Council on 22 May decided to lift trade and financial sanctions on Iraq; extend the ''oil-for-food'' programme for six months; revisit the mandates of the [[United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission]] (UNMOVIC) and the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) at a later date; request appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General; and review implementation of those and other matters within 12 months."
:[http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/2003/res1483.pdf Resolution 1483] (2003) was adopted by a vote of fourteen in favor, none against, with Syria not participating.[http://www.unic.org.in/News/2003/pr/pr81.html] Also see [http://www.unic.org.in/News/2003/pr/pr81.html resolution commentary] and [http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/documents/iamb_tor.pdf June 11, 2003 DRAFT].
[http://www.un.int/usa/03_073.htm Remarks] by Ambassador [[John Negroponte]], United States Permanent Representative to the [[United Nations]], on Iraq, at the Security Council Stake-out, May 20, 2003.
[http://www.dawn.com/2003/05/24/int12.htm NGOs decry 'bribes' & 'threats' at UN], May 24, 2003: "A coalition of over 150 peace groups and global [[non-governmental organization]]s (NGOs) is lashing out at the UN Security Council for adopting a resolution that virtually legitimizes the US-led invasion of Iraq and endorses the foreign occupation of a UN member state."
"IRW Commentary:
The remit of the IAMB is narrow and limited to oversight of the audit for the DFI ([[Development Fund for Iraq]]). Regulations for the IAMB go into force once approved by a majority of IAMB members and with agreement of the CPA ([[Coalition Provisional Authority]]).
*Responsibility. The IAMB "shall oversee the external audit processes, the financial reporting arrangements, and the system of internal controls of the DFI."
*Reporting: Audits, minutes of IAMB meetings, approved reports, and dissenting views are all to be published.
*Members: Voting members are representatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Managing Director of the IMF ([[International Monetary Fund]]), the Director-General of the [[Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development]], and the President of the [[International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]]. Additional non-voting members may be added with CPA approval.
*Concerns: These terms of reference provide an extremely narrow function. The auditor only examines whether petroleum export revenues are flowing to the DFI in correct amounts and whether the revenues are being properly stored while in the DFI. The auditors will have no power to review the most contested issues: the terms of contracts that determine what share of petroleum profits the government receives, nor whether expenditures from the DFI are being used effectively. Hence, while the terms of reference for the IAMB do create an inclusive institution, its influence will be marginal.
*[http://reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=3550371 October 2, 2003],US Seen Dragging Feet on Iraqi Oil Money Watchdog:
:"Four months after the Security Council ordered an independent board to monitor U.S. spending of Iraq's oil revenues, diplomats on Thursday accused the United States of blocking it from taking up its duties.
:"The diplomats blamed the delay on U.S. disagreements with the designated members of the as-yet nonexistent International Advisory and Monitoring Board over its duties. The board was to be created under a May 22[, 2003] Security Council resolution.....
:"Another U.S. official said the problem lay not with Washington but with the Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by Iraq's U.S. administrator, [[L. Paul Bremer]].... ''The CPA is not the U.S. government,'' this official said.
:"The May 22 resolution called for Iraqi oil revenues and other reconstruction funds -- including money left over from the U.N. oil-for-food program after it is shut down on Nov. 21 -- to be deposited in a Development Fund for Iraq, to be held by the Iraqi central bank."
:*See [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD20TradeBank-17July03.pdf Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 20]: [[Trade Bank of Iraq]], July 17, 2003, and [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD18CBI.pdf Order Number 18]: Measures to Ensure the Independence of the [[Central Bank of Iraq]], July 7, 2003.
:"The resolution awards seats on the monitoring board to the [[World Bank]], the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development but leaves the board's precise duties vague."
===Disinfopedia Resources=== *[[Development Fund for Iraq]]
===External Resources===
*[http://www.iamb.info/ The International Advisory and Monitoring Board], IAMB website. *[http://www.soros.org/dc/unmandate.htm A New Security Council Mandate for Iraq: U.S. Military and UN Civil Control the Only Way Forward], Open Society Institute, September 4, 2003: "On September 4, the U.S. circulated a draft UN Security Council (SC) Resolution." Also see [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0521-04.htm Soros Watchdog to Monitor US Use of Iraqi Oil] by Irwin Arieff, ''Common Dreams'', May 21, 2003. *[http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=586&ncid=586&e=10&u=/nm/20031022/wlnm/iraqdonorswatchdog_dc Board Set to Monitor How U.S. Spends Iraq Oil Money], Reuters, October 22, 2003. *[http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/310iraqoil/ "Iraq: the missing billions"], Christian Aid, 23 October 2003
No, I don't know anything about the GM/seed storing thing in particular. I've just skim-read the law in question (http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040426CPAORD81PatentsLaw.pdf). It would only prevent farmers from saving seed if they'd been planting 'new plant varieties' (in effect, GM). So it isn't much better or worse than the GM/IP laws everywhere else in the world. But I could be wrong about that; I've only skim-read.
What really fascinates me the amount of effort the CPA put into intellectual property. As far as I can see, they decided that the only way to sort out the Iraqi economy was to tighten up the IP laws[1], and had a binge on copyright regulations in late April last year [2].
One one level, it's completely surreal. I love that in the middle of Sadr going crazy and Abu Ghraib coming out, there were presumably lawyers holed up in the Green Zone, claiming that rewriting copyright is what will bring peace and development to Iraq.
It's also pretty sinister, and a clearer case of imperialism than the invasion itself[3]. i.e. it isn't necessarily imperialism to want to get rid of nasty genocidal dictators. It's much worse if you think that you have to micro-manage the fine print of IP law, and that when you do micro-manage it, it always comes out as a wet dream for US big business.
There's another briefing in there, but it's probably one we should have written nine months ago. And until this week, I was just about managing to forget Iraq...
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the contorted justifications in the preambles look like the things people cook up for CUSU: 'significant change to the Iraqi intellectual property system as necessary to improve the economic condition of the people of iraq'[ order 80] is one of many gems
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26/4: 'amendment to the trademark and descriptions law', which it, oddly, renames the 'trademark and geographical indications law' 26/4: 'patent, industrial design, undisclosed information, integrated circuits and plant variety law'. This is the GM one. It's 27 pages long,w hich is a pretty decent demonstration of CPA priorities 1/5: 'amendment to the copyright law'. Impossible to read without seeing the earlier law it's amending. I do know it changes the length of copyright from 'authors life+25 years' to 'author's life + 50 years'. Grrr!
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I was nervous about the using the word 'imperialism' to historians, but the first definition I looked at [from Websters 1913 dictionary] specifically mentioned copyright, so I think I'm safe. http://www.dict.org/bin/Dict?Query=imperialism&Form=Dict1&Strategy=&Database=
3 Jan 2005: IHT reports oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum has resigned in connection with falling oil production. apparently december exports were 1.3mbpd, compared to >2mbpd pre-war. partly the result of weather. Also, drivers had for 2 weeks in december refused to take petrol to the refinery at Bayji, because of the frequency of insurgent attacks on them. As of Jan 1, only a fraction (15 of the needed 70) trucks were running, said Bahr-al-Uloum. Baghdad's Dora refinery was running at 30% of capacity, because of attacks on an oil pipeline.
Electricity shortages in Baghdad increase the demand for oil, e.g. to fire private generators.
In 12/05, the government massively increased oil prices as the result of an IMF debt-cancellation deal.
21/7/05
TODO: find decent figures for the oil industry. BBC says that exports are 1.4mbpd, 80% through the south, the rest piped to Turkey, with export revenue of $17bn per yer.
Terrorist attacks have prevented oil export from Kirkuk. That's an incentive for Iraq to cosy up with Iran, to get themselves a better export route. (see JC in Salon. So, in mid-July 2005, Iraq agreed to send Iran 150,000bpd of light crude (through 3 new pipeliens built at Iranian expense), with the refined petrol etc. being shipped back to Iraq.
Iraq's oilfields
TODO: need to find a map of Iraqi oil fields; correlate with political events. Also, look at export routes
old info
Best source of information on specific attacks is Iraq Pipeline Watch
Security problems around Kirkuk have so far (as of 11/5/04) prevented significant exports through the pipeline to Ceyhan, Turkey
Chronology of oil-disrupting attacks
- attack on a key North-South pipeline
- A major attempted attack on an northern oilfield is thwarted
- 25/4/04: Two (probably coordinated)Suicide attacks on oil terminals near Basra
- 9/5/04 sabotage of pipeline on Faw peninsular may (or may not) have halted oil exports from Iraq
- [summer absence - no doubt a lot happened here]
- 5/9/04: attack on pipeline near Basra
Current targets (11/5/04) are 3 million bpd by the end of 2005, rising to 5m bpd by 2010. Current output is 1.8m bpd.
Daily Star on failure to reach pre-war oil/gas production levels.
Several oilfields are unusable due to mines.
During July, negotiations took place regarding oil exports through Tripoli, Lebanon, as well as towards an oil pipeline to Jordan.
Citing security concerns, the Southern Oil company stopped pumping on 9 August. This followed threats from the Mahdi army
IWPR, 19 Aug 04:
(Addustour) A group claiming to have a connection with Muqtada al-Sadr has announced responsibility for setting a southern oil well on fire. They said they would target the main pipelines in the south if US forces did not leave Najaf. In a statement on the internet dated August 16, and signed by "the covert action group" of the Mahdi Army, members threatened to attack the main southern pipelines if the Americans did not depart Najaf and end the siege of the city. It is worth mentioning that the southern pipelines have been closed since the August 9 when they were attacked by some saboteurs.
al-Mutamar, 1/9/04: 32 attacks on southern oil system cost 32m barrels, or $600 million, as well as $7bn to rebuild the infrastructure.
Distribution of oil wealth in Iraq
[permalink]
July 2005: strike by Basra oil workers. Called by the provincial governor, Mohammed al-Waili. According to an eamail from Ewa J, forwarded by JJ, it involved 15,000 workers in the General Union of Oil Employees.
Basra has 40% unemployment.
SIGIR is the Special Inspector-General for Iraq Reconstruction. It evolved out of the CPA's OIG, Office of the Inspector General (to the extent of keeping the same boss, Stuart W. Bowen Jr.
SIGIR oversees funds in the IRRF (Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund)
tags:
[Ozlu, 2006] claims that: as of Jan 06, 50% of the workforce was unemployed or underemployed
[doh: this is going to depend crucially on definitions of underemployment. the underemployed outnumber the unemployed by at least 2:1, and it is a highly subjective category]
unemployment data mainly comes from COSIT surveys in October 2003, May 2004 and July 2004. According to these unemployment was 28.1%, 10.5% and 26.8% respectively.
COSIT surveys use ILO definitions. These are misleading in the case of Iraq, because of:
many 'discouraged' workers, those who have stopped seeking work. These aren't included in ILO figures, but represent over 1 million Iraqis
Iraqis involved in casual, intermittent work are counted as 'self-employed', even if they do not have anything resemling full-time work. This accounts for 35% of the Baghdad workforce
Iraq has a high dependency ratio (73.97%). This is because of a young population (40% under 15), and there are few middle-aged men because of the numbers killed in the Iran-Iraq war.
Iraqi Trade Minister claimed in Jan 2004 that unemployment/underemployment was 50-60%
Iraqi Labor and Social Affairs ministry has claimed that unemployment is over 60%.
High wages increase the opportunity cost of being an insurgent.
should think of employment programs as make-work programs. It doesn't matter if workers are cleaning, painting, or whatever - just make sure they get some cash.
USAID and DoD contracts, under which most work is done in Iraq, don't emphasise the employment of Iraqis as a goal or an element of contracts
Most of the above is taken from Ozlu, 2006
==older notes==
IAG has located a decent analysis of unemployment levels in Iraq. The lack of decent post-war statistics led to a wide range of claims, from 12% (IRI) to 70% (an unpublished, but widely quoted, study by the college of economics at Baghdad University).
The difference can partly be explained by different measures of unemployment
tags:
From JC:
The same source says that Grand Ayatollah Sistani had a meeting with leading Shiite politicians and hammered out a percentage share for them in the unified Shiite party list he has proposed. SCIRI would get 12 percent of the seats generated by this unified list, the Islamic Action Organization of Ayatollah al-Mudarrisi would get 10%; the Sadrists would get 10%; the Ibrahim Jaafari wing of al-Dawa would get 10%; The Islamic Dawa Iraq Organization under Abdul Karim al-Unzi would get 10%; and Ahmad Chalabi, Abdul Karim al-Muhammadawi and Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum would share 10%. The rest of the seats, about half, would go to independents--but the parties would have a role in nominating these independents. (I'd be very surprised if some of these parties actually agreed to such small percentages). Sistani maintains that successful elections are a vital step on the way to independence (i.e. a means of getting the Americans back out of the country), and also has studied the electoral system set up by the Americans well enough to realize that a unified Shiite list has a better shance of capturing a majority in parliament. For this point, see Ed Wong of the NYT. See also Walter Pincus's important article on the mechanics of the elections in WaPo.
The articles he points to are here and here. Haven't had time to read them yet.
The lack of accurate demographic information in Iraq - partly because of a distrust of frequently-manipulated official figures collected by the Baath party or by the UN.
So in the country as a whole, each ethnic group imagines that it is the largest, and thus thinks it is underrepresented in politics.
Take Kirkuk as a regional example. According to a Times article of 10/4/04:
The official demographic composition of the city reflects the manipulation of census figures, deportations,resettlement programmes and coerced identity changes imposed by the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet Kurdish and Turkoman officials reel off conflicting statistics and dubious historical precedents to back their respective claims over Kirkuk. "The Kurds used to represent two thirds of the population here and the other third was composed of Turkomans, Jews, Assyrians and Arabs," said Jalal Jawhar, the head of the Kirkuk branch of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two leading Kurdish political organisations. Turkoman groups disagree. Turkush Oglu, of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, said: "I don't want to exaggerate, but the Turkomans in Kirkuk are about 60 to 65 per cent of the population."
from glen-danchev:
With the delays on national political processes in the first year of occupation, the CPA and the governments of Coalition states put much emphasis on forming more representative councils at the local level. This took the form of installing leaders perceived to be popular locally, and then, from late 2003 onwards, of diversifying the members of the local councils, as well as expanding the provincial council for each of Iraq's eighteen governorates to forty members, in a process known as 'refreshment'.
Both of these stages of dealing with local councils contained modest successes, although they were far from unproblematic. The mayors installed initially were often removed shortly afterwards. Karbala, for example, went through repeated changes of governors: Ali Kammunah was appointed in early May 2003, only to resign two months later due to allegations of links between a member of his council and a banned party. His replacement, Akram al-Yasiri, was dismissed by the CPA early in 2004, after publicly criticising the behaviour of US troops. The council underwent a process of refreshment, but a third of those members then resigned when Ayatollah Sistani's representative called the council illegitimate as it was not elected.
Although elections were held in a number of regions, there was little in the way of common procedures. One former senior CPA official referred to this as 'eighteen different arrangements for local government in each of the eighteen governorates'.i This lack of common standards inevitably led to a perception that when local elections were held (for example, in Dhi Qar province),ii it was because the CPA was confident of the success of pro-Coalition figures, in contrast to locations in which elections were not held or were cancelled abruptly (as in Basra in mid-February 2004). More commonly, an element of arbitrariness reigned. In Baghdad, for example, the arrangements for local councils and their meeting procedures were copied directly from Colorado, simply because the CPA's senior governance official with responsibility for Baghdad happened to be a former mayor of a Colorado town.iii The CPA retained the authority to alter the composition of the Baghdad councils at its discretion,iv and used the refreshment process to remove council members whom the CPA had itself appointed but who were since deemed unsuitable.v The CPA also apportioned to itself the role of excluding at its discretion anyone from a position on a local council if it judged that they had, inter alia, 'publicly espoused political philosophies or legal doctrines contrary to the domestic order and rule of law being established in Iraq'.vi
The centre's weakness has meant that the attempt by political parties to capture the power of the state, the predominant aim of 'normal' politics, has been neither possible given its monopolisation by the Coalition nor particularly desirable.
Outline
National
- early ambitions - future of iraq wg, other pre-war plans
- day after statement (g-danchev)
- interim govt. reduced to IGC. IGC dependency on coalition
- selection of ministers
- 15/11/03 CPA/IGC agreement decouples election from transition: caucases to select transitional national assembly to elect exec, elections in late 2005
- 2004 - sistani protest
- TAL. doesn't specify form of 05 elections, which are *only* for transitional legislative authority. permanent elections dec 05
- UN electoral aid - see sep SG report
- current status (from analysis post)
- reasons for lack of elections (glen p. 19)
Selection of Iraqi representatives
- general representation, popularity
- selection of IGC, and of ministers
- criteria of popularity/representativeness
- naive kurd/sunni/shia split, 'find somebody we like within each ethnic/religious group'
- confusion of popularity and ethnic representation - essentialises divisions
- exclusion of unsavoury figures
- bias towards exiles
- compare selections with popularity polls
Local
- May Baghdad/Kirkuk elections
- local elections cancelled (late june 03). also lack of preparation
- labour unions - g-d p. 14, cpa notice 2
- precis of glen thing, p. 16-19
The party system
[do we want this as a section? Or perhaps an FAQ in its own right?]
Draft text
Iraq: elections (technical issues)
[permalink]
Jordan Times article on the logistics of holding elections
Cobban column, argues that 31/1/05 election deadline matters, and can -just- be made, US macho tactics are hindering. election can stop Lebanonization. US rhetoric is that assaults are needed to deal with no-go areas before elections. However, in Knight Ridder
Juan Cole, a professor of a professor of Middle East studies at the University of Michigan who specializes in Shiite Islam, said the insurgency would most likely affect elections in the Sunni triangle. In other parts of the country, religious and tribal leaders in the south and north will orchestrate the elections in their communities, Cole believes.
IEC - independent electoral commission
Problems had surfaced by late July, with the UN reportedly - and in diplomatic language - having 'suggested having more preparation and readiness on technical levels for the elections'. Worries grew over the following month, until by early september the head of the elections commission, Fareed Fayyadh, was forced to deny rumours that the elections would be postponed.
May be affected by the August suspension of the census, which had been due to take place on October 12.
Times, 14/9/04: election officials can't leave the Green Zone safely, and when they do have to go incognito. The commission was set up by the CPA. I wonder if that is causing problems (I'd guess the Allawi government is more popular than the CPA, but not by much).
The problem of postal voting has already been discussed on JC: London-based expats have been demanding a postal vote, but many expats are no longer Iraqi citizens, and Sunnis are paranoid because 4 fifths of the 5 million expats are shia
Dear list,
There have recently been a couple of good articles on progress towards the January elections (1, 5), as well as a Secretary General's report earlier in the month giving a summary of the limited progress over the summer (16, p. 7-9). Throughout that period, worries about the deadline have been floating around, with the UN quietly panicking (2), and Iraqi politicians needing to publicly deny that there have been problems (3)
The first question is whether the elections will happen at all. Kofi Annan has been becoming gradually more pessimistic in his public statements, most recently telling the BBC that "You cannot have credible elections if the security conditions continue as they are now."(17). I imagine the US wants to avoid any definite postponement before their own elections, so I wouldn't wait for anything so downbeat from them. The UN election assistants have fled to Jordan (5), and the (Iraqi) members of the electoral commission ((4) has a list of their names) rarely dare leave the Green Zone, and when they do feel forced to travel incognito (1). And candidates will have a hard time roaming the country without getting shot. Ironically, they'll need to travel because of the proportional representation system, which was put in place to make it harder for local militias to intimidate candidates.
In such a climate, it's natural that most people, like Annan, see security as the main problem. Unfortunately, this has led to an extremely counter-productive approach from the military, which insists that it must invade 'no-go areas' like Najaf and Fallujah in order to provide security for elections. For example an AP from a fortnight ago says that "The U.S. military will work to regain control of rebel strongholds and turn them over to Iraq's fledgling security forces so elections will be seen by Iraqis - and the world - as free and fair." (13)
Helena Cobban picks this argument apart in the Christian Science Monitor (12). She argues - based on a comparison to South Africa - that: "For elections to be held and to be judged valid in any part of Iraq, it is not necessary that US forces be in control of that area - only that it be peaceable enough to allow free access by election workers, candidates, and party organizers, all of whom are Iraqi, not American. If the election process has enough general political credibility in the country, they will have the access they need."
In fact, escalating the conflict with Sadr is having the opposite effect, opening up the awful possibility of no elections in Fallujah whatsoever: "At the weekend Dr Allawi mooted an alternative possibility, also floated by Lieutenant- General Thomas Metz, operations chief of the 150,000 US-led troops in Iraq: that elections could be prevented or delayed in Fallujah without prejudicing the overall result." (1)
Looking at Allawi's comments another way, they're just another step in the long process of scaling back expectations for the elections. In June the UN thought 30,000 polling stations would be needed(6). Now, they're planning to have 7,000 (5). The same scaling-back is happening with voter registration. In June, the UN was planning to use oil for food ration cards to identify voters (9). This was replaced by a plan to have a full census, which would have taken place on October 12 (7). As the 21 July IPO news analysis (10) explains, this is a good thing because the "ration card database is deeply flawed. The Hajj pilgrimage allocations, executed in December and which were based on that database, resulted in gross overestimation of population size of districts that were Ba'athi strongholds, and underestimation of population size from districts that were hostile to Saddam." I'd add to that the practical problem that however good the ration cards were two years ago, they're out of date now, given the large migrations, return of expatriates, etc. A census would also be extremely useful for other reasons (11) However, the census was cancelled in late August because of security concerns(8), and so we're back to the OFF cards (5). What's worse, the procedure for dealing with discrepencies is pretty flimsy: "Residents will be able to look at the list for six weeks in November and December to make corrections...We don't have time to worry too much" (5)
Another issue that pops up from time to time is postal voting for non-resident Iraqis. Not surprisingly, the 5-million-strong expatriate community are keen on this, but there are problems. Leaving aside the practical issues of finding them, registering them, and getting them ballot papers, there is the problem that many of those who would class themselves as Iraqi don't have official citizenship. Because 4 fifths of the expatriates are Shia, some Sunni groups may also object to postal voting (15). To understand the significance of this, bear in mind that five million people is somewhere around a sixth of the total population.
The obvious next question is what happens if elections are postponed or seriously flawed. I'd love to hear your thoughts on this, but in the meantime I'll leave you with this comment from Juan Cole (18):
Sistani's quite resonable demand for elections is nevertheless among the greatest dangers facing the Allawi government and the Americans. It will be extremely difficult actually to hold the elections on time. But Sistani believes only such elections can produce a legitimate government, and he already accepted a six-month delay. If the elections are not held, and if Sistani begins to fear they won't be held soon, he may well call the masses into the streets. That could lead to an overthrow of Allawi and an expulsion of the Americans. Keep your eye on February and March of 2005.
1. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1261760,00.html
2. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_127.html
3. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_151.html
4. http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/c9d627bb6f3a7aeb85256ea9006561f5?OpenDocument
5. http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43063&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis
6. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-06-16-iraq-vote_x.htm
7. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_133.html
8. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_139.html
9. http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=41446&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ
10. http://www.casi.org.uk/analysis/2004/msg00380.html
11. http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/6574f59d163e714b85256eaf005795d0?OpenDocument
12. http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0909/p09s01-coop.htm
13. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64018-2004Sep5.html
14. http://www.boston.com/dailynews/252/world/Annan_warns_that_violence_in_I:.shtml
15. http://www.juancole.com/2004_07_01_juancole_archive.html#108956703612409175
16. http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/unsc-irq-03sep.pdf
17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661640.stm
18. http://www.juancole.com/2004_09_01_juancole_archive.html#109530515235243454
Items surfacing after the mesage:
Allawi says that "we definitely are going to stick to the timetable of elections in January next year". (19/9)
Article 14 of the TAL states that
The individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social security. The Iraqi State and its governmental units, including the federal government, the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations, within the limits of their resources and with due regard to other vital needs, shall strive to provide prosperity and employment opportunities to the people.
By article 25, The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the following matters: ... (B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and maintaining armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of the country's borders and to defend Iraq;
By article 54, "the Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security"
By article 59: B) Consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the transitional period, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and any subsequent relevant resolutions. This arrangement shall last until the ratification of a permanent constitution and the election of a new government pursuant to that new constitution. (C) Upon its assumption of authority, and consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, the elected Iraqi Transitional Government shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations under these agreements, or under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, which will govern the multi-national force's activities pending the entry into force of these agreements.
However, the structures laid down in the CPA orders cannot be changed until the 'Iraqi Transitional Government' takes office, which will not be before January 2005
on nations: baath-era constitutions declared
And another batch...
AP article: some trivia about the elections, including that indelible ink will be used to mark people who have voted. The article worries about people taking off their ink. I (as usual, without special knowledge) wonder about the opposite: what's to stop somebody running round a district they expect to vote against them with a tub of ink, and daubing people's thumbs?
Sunni participation is likely to be low. The article begins "Leaders of Iraq's sunni Arab minority have failed to generate any enthusiasm for...elections". This relies on the assumption that Shia and Sunni politicians are trying equally hard, which doesn't seem to be true. Nobody is really sure which sunni groups will participate in the elections, but Sistani started on a voter registration drive in October 2004.
Sistani has been calling for a slate of (Shia) independents.
SCIRI election workers are having to conceal their identities
Glen writes on the elections for LLB. Support for the elections is low: unpublished state department survey suggests <33% of Sunnis will vote. Polling booth locations won't be revealed until the last minute. Only the INA has been allowed much TV advertising. He finishes, with that academic 'I know silly historical facts' smile:
One odd but instructive feature of statements by US and UK officials has been the mantra that these elections are $B!H(Bthe first free elections Iraq has seen in 50 years$B!I(B. They are referring to the elections of June 1954, held under the rule of the British-appointed strongman Nuri al-Sa$B!G(Bid. Like the 2005 version, those elections also led to the formation of an assembly. But Nuri only allowed the assembly to convene once, and he dissolved it completely nine days later. The repression by Nuri$B!G(Bs government, in league with the British, was all the more brutal afterwards. The same process, 50 years later, may well be at work again.
Election monitors are working from Jordan or Toronto.
After the elections
WaPo: election official falsely claimed non-voters would lose ration cards, in an attempt to boost turnout. In Mosul,
' In areas of the city where Kurds and Christians live, people were angry because ballot boxes had not arrived and they were unable to cast ballots. Officials ultimately went on television to announce that voting will be permitted Monday for those left out'
The Washington Post also has some disgusting Bush cheerleading:
For President Bush, it was one of the biggest gambles of his presidency. The doubters said it was crazy to hold an election in the middle of a war zone. The skeptics feared a massive wave of violence. Bush ignored them and insisted on going forward. The payoff, his aides said, was perhaps one of the best days of his administration. Whatever happens next, the pictures of Iraqi voters streaming to the polls and holding up ink-stained fingers to show they had cast their ballots will go down as one of the defining images of his ambitious project to introduce democracy to the Middle East.
Last modified: Sun Nov 5 05:50:53 CET 2006